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Abstract 
 
 
The object of this dissertation is to ascertain the conceivability, usefulness, and 
potential impact of using human dignity as a unifying theory to address emerging issues 
within contemporary bioethics in consideration of revolutionary gene-editing practices 
applicable to human beings that may directly challenge the definition of what it means to 
be human.  
To this end, we will examine the relevance, scope and limitations of the concept 
of human dignity under recent developments in the technology of gene-editing, and 
more specifically germline editing, the practice of editing the genes of human embryos in 
order to create genetically modified people able to pass on these modifications to future 
generations. 
 
These technological advances call for a review and revision of international 
regulations in the law of bioethics. The subject is explored in particular in relation to the 
first experimental case of babies born from gene-edited embryos, by applying human 
dignity as en ethical tool to assess possible legal implications. This assessment will be 
conducted through a study of recent literature on the subject of human dignity, bioethics 
law and genomic manipulation as it pertains to the case, as well as the reports of expert 
committees and relevant case law, an analysis of the existing legal and regulatory 
context for gene-editing, which relies heavily on human rights principles, as well as a 
doctrinal analysis of the current understandings surrounding these subjects. 
 
We will showcase a range of theoretical understandings of human dignity, the 
current progression of its use as a basis for bioethics regulations, institutions, and its 
application to practices, demonstrating both its potential as the "Theory of Everything" in 
bioethics that is supported by Charles Foster, but also the severe limitations that require 
urgent deliberation and international consensus on how to leverage the use of human 
dignity as an ethical standard.
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Introduction 
 
Until a few years ago, manipulation of the human genome was technically at a 
halt. The technology to read and compile our genetic code or DNA existed, but attempts 
to edit it remained outside of our reach, and scientific experimentation was focused on 
the cellular level instead, within the promising field of stem cell research. However, the 
discovery of CRISPR-cas9, a gene-editing method derived from the natural process 
used by bacteria to target specific segments of DNA, has made gene-editing fast, 
accurate, and incredibly accessible.1 It opens up the possibility to cure diseases and 
harmful genetic conditions and even to prevent them from developing in the first place. 
Beyond the numerous medical applications, however, the ability to alter the genetic 
make-up of an individual raises profound ethical concerns, and thus legal ones as well, 
not only as to the acceptability and potential risks accompanying the human 
experimentations necessary to develop these techniques but also regarding the social 
and moral ramifications of their implementation. In addition, gene editing can be used to 
alter sperm or egg cells, also called germline cells, and embryo cells, both of which are 
the source of genetic material for all other cells in the organism. As such, germline gene 
editing is able to pass on modifications to future generations and carries the potential for 
repercussions on the evolution of the species as a whole.2  
 
 Unfortunately, there is currently no unified regime of regulation for 
research around this subject. The rapid pace of these evolutions in biotechnology and 
their consequences makes it pressing and crucial to scrutinise the theoretical tools at the 
disposal of legal systems in order to reevaluate their efficacy and applicability. In 
addition, responding to ethical issues raised calls for a well-developed overarching 
global theory that can, in turn, serve as the backbone to an international regulatory 
system. The current regime relevant to these emergent biotechnologies revolves around 
international declarations of principles and intent, and specialised legislation at the 
territorial level on technology-specific implementations. Such international instruments, 
and by extension national regulations, rely heavily on mentions of the principle of human 
                                                     
1 ‘What are genome editing and CRISPR-Cas9?’ (10 October 2017) 
https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/genomicresearch/genomeediting accessed 27 August 2019. 
2 Ormond KE and others, ‘Human Germline Genome Editing’ (2017) Am J Hum Genet 101(2) 167-176. 
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dignity, derived from the international human rights law framework. This modern 
conception of dignity emerged from the ashes of the Second World War to signify a 
strong belief in the equal inherent worth of every individual, though its roots reveal a 
more varied patchwork of interpretations.3 It has gained traction in contemporary ethics, 
the study of how moral standards are defined in society, and subsequent human rights 
instruments that use it as a universal rationale for a supranational system of rights. The 
inherent dignity of every human being serves as the basis from which equality, the 
sanctity of life, essential freedoms, and fundamental rights, are derived in human rights 
doctrine. As such, the area of bioethics, which draws from both ethics and human rights 
perspectives, has seen the concomitant adoption of human dignity as a conceptual tool. 
At the intersection of philosophy, law, social sciences and the life sciences, it is the 
branch of applied ethics that considers both ethical and legal issues arising from 
studying the interactions of living beings, and especially human beings, and their 
environment, notably in biology and medicine.4 Bioethics is precisely the domain where 
the consequences and governance of biotechnologies are given due consideration. 
There, the notion of dignity has been widely deployed in related international documents 
to serve both as a moral standard of the absolute value of a human being and as an 
alternative legal standard to personal autonomy. Human dignity is a philosophical 
concept that has become a "universal ethical and legal principle,"5 and is foundational in 
the exploration of personhood, identity, the value of human worth, and the nature of 
humanity. However, it suffers from a range of issues that render it open to contestation, 
from uncertainty as to its theoretical basis to ambiguity around its meaning or 
inconsistency in its deployment. In effect, dignity has been used to both empower, and 
constrain genomic research, begging the question as to its suitability as a bioethical tool. 
Human dignity remains a controversial notion and its value as a moral or legal standard, 
whether in human rights or bioethics, has been debated by academics and researchers 
alike. This enduring and nebulous ambivalence indicates the additional need for an in-
depth analysis of its scope and import, which we will conduct while exploring genomic 
manipulation, and especially germline gene-editing, as current points of contention in 
bioethics and the law.  
 
                                                     
3 Jeff Malpas and Norelle Lickiss (eds.), Perspectives on Human Dignity: A Conversation, Springer 2017. 
4 Roberto Andorno, ‘Human dignity and human rights as a common ground for a global bioethics’ (2009) 
34 Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 223. 
5 Roberto Andorno, ‘Human Dignity’ in Henk ten Have, Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, Springer 2015. 
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 This research proposes to identify the extent to which human dignity is, 
and has been used as a legal tool in a global bioethics framework, its limitations in that 
regard, and interactions with changes in societies or shifts of its meaning, as well as 
their legal repercussions. The subject will be approached through the issue of genomic 
exploration and modification, in order to determine the extent to which human dignity is 
able to contend with the legal implications of these expanding ethical boundaries. In 
order to address these issues, this project will first attempt to circumscribe the notion of 
human dignity in a legal context, including the current conceptions surrounding it, in 
particular through the work of Charles Foster, and its limitations. This will be undertaken 
chiefly by doctrinal analysis of recent literature on the subject of human dignity, bioethics 
law, and genomic manipulation, as well as the reports of expert committees and relevant 
case law. Subsequently, we will examine recent evolutions in the legal doctrine around 
the bioethics law on genomic manipulation and its relation to the critical concept of 
human dignity extended to consent. Lastly, the dissertation will attempt to catalogue 
some of the different modifications undergone by legal systems and expert opinions 
through a comparative analysis of different jurisdictional frameworks. 
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I. Human dignity as the defining principle of bioethics and its 
application to genome editing technologies 
What is the importance of human dignity in the international normative framework of bioethics? What is 
the purpose of human dignity in the law of bioethics and does its ubiquity throughout multiple 
interpretations weaken the concept as a legal tool?  
 
 
a. The role of dignity in the international framework pertaining to human 
genome editing 
 
Human dignity has both been defined as “the shaping principle” of international 
bioethics6 and a "mere slogan", "a useless concept in medical ethics" that "can be 
eliminated without loss of content".7 Regardless of its perceived flaws, the prominence of 
dignity in the bioethics discourse is undeniable. From the Declaration of Helsinki on the 
protection of human participants in experimentation8 to the Universal Declaration on the 
Human Genome setting out guidance for a legal framework around genetic research9 
and the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine10, dignity is cited as a principle, 
and perhaps even a right, to be upheld and protected against abuse. Moreover, multiple 
international organisms rely on its language. The international regulatory framework on 
human genome editing falls within the oversight of biomedical practice and research 
regulations, which are also informed by human rights principles and conventions. This 
creates a primary, strong connection between bioethics laws and the reliance on human 
dignity as a concept through its role within human rights.The presence necessitates a 
careful examination in order to reveal the role dignity plays as well as its shortcomings 
within this legal context, and especially in relation to the issues brought about by the 
specificities of gene editing on human subjects. In addition, the rights-based framework 
surrounding dignity further fuels the debate on its status as a right or principle itself. We 
will necessarily attempt, if not to clarify, to explore these facets of dignity and expose its 
purpose in bioethics through its application to the regulation of gene editing practices on 
                                                     
6 Nöelle Lenoir and Bertrand Mathieu, Les normes internationales de la bioéthique, Presses Universitaires 
de France 1998. 
7 Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity Is a Useless Concept’ (2003) 327 BMJ 1419-1420. 
8 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 1964. 
9 UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights 1997. 
10 Oviedo, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, 4 April 1997. 
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human beings. 
 
i. Human dignity in relation to  international human rights law 
 
Human dignity plays a prominent role in many legal systems and regulatory 
instruments that call upon human rights principles, such as those concerning human 
experimentation and research on human gene editing. This is in major part due to the 
fact that it is inextricably linked to the protection of human rights, both due to the desire 
to safeguard the rights of patients and researchers alike, and to an insistence on the 
respect for human dignity.11 It is the founding concept upon which the modern human 
rights system is built, one derived from the international instruments at the source of 
international human rights law. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights has 
claimed that its “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable 
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace in the world.” In conjunction with the The Vienna Declaration of 1993’s statement 
that “all human rights derive from the dignity and worth inherent in the human person,”12 
and both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)13 and 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 14 setting out 
in their preambles that the rights contained within "derive from the inherent dignity of the 
human person,” this positions dignity as a universal source of rights. Seen otherwise, 
human rights would be those rights necessary to protect human dignity. From its legal 
framework to its schools of thought and derived approaches, the cornerstone of human 
rights thinking is the notion that there is a fundamental element within the characteristics 
of human beings that is inherently worthy of respect, and that each human being is 
equally possessed of it in such a way that the existence of every human being is equally 
valuable and worthy of respect. In turn, this status ought to be protected by the 
guarantee of essential rights equally granted to each individual. That is the foundational 
understanding of human dignity, one that seems to emerge from the documents 
establishing the basis for the human rights framework, the framework that many 
                                                     
11 Roger Brownsword, ‘Human dignity from a legal perspective’ in Marcus Düwell and others (eds), The 
Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity, CUP 2014. 
12 The Vienna Declaration on Human Rights 1993. 
13 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966. 
14 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 
1966. 
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bioethics instruments have been attached to. However, two things should be noted 
before further analysis. The first is the lack of clear definition not only of the meaning of 
dignity in those texts but also of "the relationship between human rights and human 
dignity."15 The second is that, as Donnelly noted, "dignity carries more independent 
weight in bioethics contexts that in standard international human rights contexts". 16 
 
ii. Human  dignity in relation to  international bioethics  law 
 
The Declaration of Helsinki, adopted in 1964, sets out as its first basic principle 
for all medical research that "it is the duty of the physician in medical research to protect 
the life, health, privacy, and dignity of the human subject."17 This early mention of 
"dignity" places it amongst other recognised human rights, the right to life,18 to health,19 
to privacy20. It imposes a duty, one that is moral if not yet legal, an obligation to protect 
it. The first legally binding international instrument on biomedicine, the Council of 
Europe’s Oviedo Convention, is fully titled as the ‘Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology 
and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’, with the stated aim "to 
preserve human dignity, rights and freedoms, through a series of principles and 
prohibitions against the misuse of biological and medical advances."21 Its opening article 
indeed sets the convention’s object and purpose as the necessity for its parties to give 
effect in their internal law to its provisions in order to "protect the dignity and identity of 
all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their 
integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of 
biology and medicine."22 The obligation here to protect the dignity of all human beings is 
placed on the same level as the protection of their identity, their integrity, and their 
fundamental rights and freedoms. The reasoning behind this purpose is given in the 
preamble, which states that the Parties have resolved "to take such measures as are 
                                                     
15 David Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2001). 
16 Jack Donnelly, ‘Human Dignity and Human Rights’ (2009). 
17 World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki 1964, section B para 10. 
18 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) 1948, art 3. 
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, art 12. 
20 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, art 17. 
21 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 164, Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Dignity 
of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights 
and Biomedicine 1997, summary. 
22 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 164 (n 21), art 1. 
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necessary to safeguard human dignity (…)" due to the joint conviction of "the need to 
respect the human being both as an individual and as a member of the human species" 
and a recognition of "the importance of ensuring the dignity of the human being", while 
being "conscious that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts endangering 
human dignity".23  
 
 Unfortunately, a clearer definition of what exactly "dignity" represents is not 
forthcoming, although this preamble emphasises both its importance and the need to 
defend it against the threat posed by misuse in biomedicine. The text goes on to outline 
which processes are prohibited and how to conduct good practice, notably with article 13 
restricting gene editing practices while prohibiting germline gene editing.24 The 
Additional Protocol of 2005 concerning Biomedical Research also underlines in its 
Preamble that "biomedical research that is contrary to human dignity and human rights 
should never be carried out",25 requiring amongst other measures that scientific 
research be independently examined by an ethics committee, whose purpose would be 
to ensure "the ethical acceptability of the research project" with a view explicitly to the 
protection of "the dignity, rights, safety and well-being of research participants."26 This 
does not, again, clarify the boundaries of "dignity", but it seems to indicate its use as a 
standard. Beyond its status as the foundational concept of human rights, human dignity 
is recognised as a normative principle of bioethics.27 Other such additional protocols to 
the Oviedo Convention have been released, but we will particularly reference the one on 
the prohibition of cloning human beings,28 which declares that "the instrumentalisation of 
human beings through the deliberate creation of genetically identical humans is contrary 
to human dignity and thus constitutes a misuse of biology and medicine."29  
 
The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (UDHGHR),30 issued by the 
                                                     
23 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 164 (n 21), preamble. 
24 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 164 (n 21), art 13. 
25 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 195, Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, concerning Biomedical Research 1995. 
26 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 195 (n 25), art 9. 
27 Jack Donnelly (n 16). 
28 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 168, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on 
the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings 1998. 
29 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 168 (n 28), preamble. 
30 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Universal Declaration on the Human 
Genome and Human Rights, 1997. 
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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) a few months after the 
Oviedo Convention’s signature, mentions "dignity" fifteen times total, of which three are in its preamble, 
going so far as to name its first heading "Human dignity and the human genome".31 This declaration can 
be considered as of yet the primary source of international obligations on human gene editing as it was 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly Resolution on December 1998.32 In contrast, the Oviedo 
Convention remains a regional instrument although it boasts thirty-five signatories and twenty-nine 
ratifications.33 Dignity in the UDHGHR is sometimes but not always referenced in conjunction with human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the UNESCO is bound to respect the original UDHR and Human 
Right Covenants. This reinforces trend in international instruments relating to human genome editing to 
use the notion of human dignity as the rationale for the standards they set. This is done either through the 
establishment of the protection of dignity as the purpose for their existence or applying it as the ethical 
principle from which they derive their normative or prescriptive standards, and sometimes both. Before 
addressing individually the content of this instrument, it is important to note its effect in international law 
and for national legislation. The UDHGHR, while not legally binding, nevertheless remains soft law in 
international law. Essentially, its articles are not merely ethical standards and acquire legal value.34  
 
 The first of these articles states that "the human genome underlies the fundamental unity 
of all members of the human family, as well as the recognition of their inherent dignity and diversity. In a 
symbolic sense, it is the heritage of humanity."35 It paints human dignity, beyond the purview of the 
individual, as a unifying characteristic of the human species in parallel to its distinctive genomic code, 
which lends weight to the idea of dignity as a universal value. Article 2 declares that "everyone has a right 
to respect for their dignity and for their rights regardless of their genetic characteristics" and this very 
dignity "makes it imperative not to reduce individuals to their genetic characteristics and to respect their 
uniqueness and diversity."36 Together, these first articles set out the relationship between human dignity 
and the human genome, with the latter serving as a vessel for the former. The articles 6, 10 and 15 
reference in one breath "human rights, fundamental freedoms and human dignity."37 Article 11 prohibits 
"practices which are contrary to human dignity".38 The instrument also emphasises the obligation for 
States to take measures "regarding the fundamental issues relating to the defence of human dignity which 
may be raised by research in biology, in genetics and in medicine, and its applications."39 Article 24 sets 
out the statutory powers of the UNESCO’s International Bioethics Committee.40 It specifically makes 
mention of giving advice "in particular regarding the identification of practices that could be contrary to 
                                                     
31 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 168 (n 28), section 1. 
32 United Nations Human Rights, Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 1998 
33 Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 164 (n 21), signatures. 
34 Roberto Andorno (n 4). 
35 UNESCO (n 30), art 1. 
36 UNESCO (n 30), art 2. 
37 UNESCO (n 30), art 6, 10. 
38 UNESCO (n 30), art 11. 
39 UNESCO (n 30), art 21 
40 UNESCO, ‘International Bioethics Committee (IBC)’ https://en.unesco.org/themes/ethics-science-
and-technology/ibc accessed 25 November 2019. 
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human dignity, such as germ-line interventions."41 This specific prohibition will be explored in a later 
section, while we will discuss international bodies pertaining to bioethics briefly in the next part of this 
section. 
 
 In 2005, UNESCO adopted the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights.42 It 
reaffirms the emphasis of the UDHGHR on human dignity as a key principle as well as the reliance of 
bioethics on human rights. The discourse around human dignity does not significantly differ from the 
preceding instruments upon which it builds. Nevertheless, two particular formulations are noteworthy: the 
declaration aims to promote human dignity "by ensuring respect for the life of human beings"43 and "the  
fundamental  equality  of  all  human  beings  in  dignity  and  rights  is  to  be respected so that they are 
treated justly and equitably."44 Common threads can be noted on the role assigned to human dignity in 
these conventions. For example, the UN Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/69 of 25 April 
2003 entitled “Human rights and bioethics”,45 which strongly insists on the need to ensure the protection of 
human rights in this field and makes a recurring appeal to the “dignity of the human being” continues to 
present human dignity as an articulation of human rights and bioethics. However, it is also clear that there 
are several possible interpretations to its purpose and its place in relationship to gene-editing and human 
rights. Human dignity is consistently present in the preamble of the instruments we have examined, firmly 
establishing it as a foundational principle. This lends significant weight to the idea that "dignity is both the 
foundation and the ultimate aim of human rights systems,"46 systems into which the international bioethics 
conventions seek to insert themselves. However, there are also significant differences in the way that 
dignity is incorporated into the body of these instruments.  
 
 Human dignity is, turn by turn, presented as a value, a right or a component of the content 
of specific rights, a status that gives rise to rights and duties, and a principle serving as a standard for 
action. It is treated as a source of right, in the aspect of a foundational principle that we have described 
above, but also as the purpose of human rights. The latter represents the idea that human rights exist to 
protect dignity, and they are present because of this in the domain of bioethics where it is particularly 
threatened. Human dignity also stands as a benchmark when considering the article on the integrity of 
persons. Yet, while its purpose may vary, it purportedly serves another function as a placeholder value. 
"Where there are tensions between different fields of international law, or emerging practices in 
international law, human dignity is an important tool for focusing on the normative forces at work, in 
particular the significance of the individual as transcending the boundaries of state authority and as 
justifying state authority. It is fair to say that at this level human dignity is of enormous symbolic 
importance though human dignity is not, in itself, an enforceable norm of international law (the exception 
                                                     
41 UNESCO (n 30), art 24. 
42 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights. (2005). Records of the General Conference, 
33rd session Paris, 3-21 October 2005, adopted 19 October. 
43 UNESCO (n 30), art 2c. 
44 UNESCO (n 30), art 10. 
45 ‘Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/69: Human Rights and Bioethics’ (2003) 
46 Catherine Dupre, ‘Unlocking Human Dignity: Towards a Theory for the 21st Century’ in European 
Human Rights Law Review Issue 2, OUP 2009. 
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to this is in international humanitarian law’s Common Article 3, a prohibition on “outrages upon personal 
dignity”)." 47 While there have been attempts to establish an international consensus on scientific research 
and national legislation, such as the International Summit on Human Genome Editing, held in December 
2015, the current lack of such consensus requires the significance of human dignity to draw collective 
understandings on the bioethics of genome editing together. 
 
iii. International organisations and interpretations of dignity 
 
There are a number of international organisms, both institutions and associations, which have an 
impact on the international bioethical scene, notably through reports, published guidelines and advocacy. 
The leading institution is the UNESCO’S International Bioethics Committee, a body of 36 independent 
experts appointed on matters of evolutions in the life sciences, their research and application. Their aim, 
as described above, is to ensure the respect of human dignity and fundamental freedoms and rights. It is 
joined in this endeavour by another UN institution for medical health, the World Health Organization 
(WHO), created in 1948. This institution promotes the right to health as the highest standard of living and 
also provides a service for ethical guidance and whistleblowing in the form of the Office of Compliance, 
Risk Management and Ethics.48The World Health Organisation (WHO) Expert Advisory Committee on 
Developing Global Standards for Governance and Oversight of Human Genome Editing has published a 
paper on the Ethics of Human Genome Edition.49 In addition, the Global Health Ethics Unit examines 
ethical issues that arise in the course of the organization’s functioning as well as facilitating a support 
network for states attempting to address ethical issues on their national territory,. ranging “from public 
health surveillance to developments in genomics, and from research with human beings to fair access to 
health services.”50 Critically, the unit publishes reports on these issues to raise awareness although it has 
yet to have one commissioned on gene editing.51 The Monash Bioethics Centre was established by 
Professor Peter Singer in 1980 as Australia's first research centre devoted to bioethics and seeks to 
address ethical questions that arise due to progress in the biological sciences.  
 
The various statements of the ethics committee of the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO),52 
which emphasise the need to “adhere to international norms of human rights” and to accept and uphold 
“human dignity and freedom”.53 Founded in 1988, it is an international organisation of scientists involved in 
human genetics, much like the the Human Genome Project (HGP), which is also a global collaborative 
scientific endeavour with the goal of mapping and sequencing the entire chain of human DNA and genes. 
                                                     
47 Stephen Riley and Gerhard Bos, 'Human Dignity' (2016) https://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-dign/ 
accessed 18 August 2019. 
48 https://www.who.int/about/ethics/ accessed 2 November 2019. 
49 Guilia Cavaliere, ‘The Ethics of Human Genome Editing’ (2019). 
50 https://www.who.int/health-topics/ethics accessed 2 November 2019. 
51 https://www.who.int/ethics/publications/year/en/ accessed 2 November. 
52 Human Genome Organisation's (HUGO) Ethics Committee. Statements. in Roberto Andorno Global 
bioethics at UNESCO: in defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 2007. 
53 HUGO (n 48). 
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Several associations are equally active in the field, the Association of Responsible Research and 
Innovation in Genome Editing (ARRIGE), the Genome Writers Guild (GWG) and the Japanese Society for 
Genome Editing (JSGE). They have published joint statements on the use of genome editing techniques 
in human embryos leading to live births.54 The ARRIGE has likewise made a statement on the He Jiankui 
incident, an unsanctioned experiment on living human beings. 55 It is clear that there is a number of active 
international actors seeking to regulate and provide guidance on the bioethics of genome editing, and that 
they refer as well prominently to human dignity in their efforts. 
 
 
b.  The human rights framework relating to genome editing 
 
The legal presence of human dignity is most often found in relation to human rights, as a source 
from which they derive their meaning – the preservation, protection, of the sanctity of human dignity. This 
stands as a replacement and reminder in its vague outline, of the natural rights origin of modern human 
rights and their substantial source in the necessity of a higher design. Indeed, "human rights, from the 
UDHR to the present, has been motivated by the desire to safeguard “human dignity” generally. Bioethics 
[...], although directed at enhancing the availability and quality of healthcare, often both draws and impacts 
on “human dignity."56 The relation between human rights and human dignity, as we have seen above, is a 
complex one.57 It can be found in almost every instance of documentation that has been explored here 
and yet this overabundance only causes it to become more difficult to clarify. Further obscuring the issue, 
there are a great many instances where the bioethics framework is positioned in relation to human rights, 
in such a way that both strengthens the importance of dignity as a legal concept while further diluting its 
precise role and purpose. Conjointly, there have been both critiques and defences of the reliance of 
bioethical standards on a human rights framework.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
54ARRIGE, ‘Common statement between the Association for Responsible Research and Innovation in 
Genome Editing (ARRIGE), the Genome Writers Guild (GWG) and the Japanese Society for 
Genome Editing (JSGE)’ http://arrige.org/Common_statement_Arrige_GWG_JSGE.pdf accessed 3 
December 2019. 
55 ARRIGE, ‘Statement from ARRIGE Steering Committee on the possible first gene-edited 
babies’ http://arrige.org/ARRIGE_statement_geneeditedbabies.pdf accessed 4 December 2019. 
56 Shawn H.E. Harmon, ‘The Significance of UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome & 
Human Rights’ (2005). 
57 Jeremy Waldron, 'Is Dignity the Foundation of Human Rights?' (2013) Public Law Research Paper No. 
12-73. 
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i. The significance of the human rights framework for  bioethics regulation 
 
Roberto Andorno, writing in defence of the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, 
quotes an aphorism by Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld on the UN’s aspiration to merely prevent 
hell,  not reach paradise.58 He draws the parallel towards the UNESCO’s work on bioethics, one that is 
flawed and yet plays an irreplaceable role in current frameworks. According to Andorno, human dignity 
relies on human rights to provide an effective legal framework through which to enforce claims to rights 
and thus ensure the protection of dignity in its role as a normative standard of bioethics.59 It is true that the 
aim to safeguard areas that touch on human rights principles, such as integrity, privacy, health or equality, 
makes it natural to refer to an already existing framework on which to build up.  Adding the prominence of 
references to human dignity, it appears equally evident that the human rights framework is a necessity, as 
without it dignity would risk becoming merely “an ethical concept with no regulatory force in international 
law” 60 Nevertheless, the human rights framework builds upon existing issues of lack of global governance 
and enforcement in the international legal system, compounding them with an unclear basis that is 
contested by adherents of cultural relativism. It is often used as a policy tool instead of the supranational 
legal standard of minimum protection  that it should represent, emancipated from national systems of 
normas that may be insufficient. It is still undetermined, however, if it is the correct system for maximum 
legal effectiveness in bioethics. In fact, "the notion of human dignity is beginning to be seen as the last 
barrier against the alteration of some basic features of the human species that might result from practices 
such as reproductive cloning or germ-line interventions. It should be noted that resorting to human rights is 
insufficient to cope with these new challenges because human rights only belong to existing individuals, 
not to humanity as such."61Paradoxically, some have also "feared that, insofar as human dignity is 
assumed in various legal contexts to override the interests of an individual human, its adoption could 
endanger the commitment to human rights. If human dignity is a concept with an under-determined 
content but which could trump human rights, it could be a kind of Trojan horse in relation to human rights 
regimes." 62 As such, there remains a tension in the positioning of the individual in the center of a human 
rights framework that may not correspond to the framing required for a regulatory bioethics system in 
practice. 
 
 
ii. Human rights relevant to genome editing 
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A report for the UK’s Nuffield Council of Bioethics on genome editing regulations reveals sets out a 
number of human rights that have implications for genome editing, the first of which is human dignity.63 
There is for some a right to the respect of dignity. 64 In addition, the right to health, which includes 
reproductive health, to integrity, as well as to enjoy the benefits from scientific progress and the freedom 
of scientific research65 are all relevant to the bioethics of genome editing. A more controversial right is the 
right to genetic identity, one that once again makes a connection between human dignity and the issue of 
identity.66 
 
In essence, it appears clear that the human rights framework presents both advantages and 
disadvantages. It functions for bioethics somewhat like Churchill’s affirmation on democracy, as the worst 
form of government, except for all the others that have been tried so far. In conclusion, human dignity can 
be considered as being present through two main channels in bioethics. Firstly, an international human 
rights law notion, one ambiguous and multi-faceted in its interpretation but nonetheless part of a rights-
based framework, whether as its foundation, as a defining source of rights, as a standard of achievement 
or as a fundamental value, sometimes used to define the boundaries of the individual sphere that needs 
protections or sometimes used to define the limits of where an individual or collective should not 
encroach.67 Secondly, a bioethics principle on the same level as autonomy, benevolence, non-
maleficence and justice, all of which will be explained more in-depth later on. It is in this context a 
coordinate principle to other, equally useful tools for determining normative and prescriptive standards of 
biomedicine. 
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65 UDHR, article 15. 
66 Raposo, ‘Gene Editing: The Mystic Threat to Human Dignity’ (2019). 
67 Roger Brownsword, ‘Human dignity from a legal perspective’ in M. Düwell, J. Braarvig, R. Brownsword, 
& D. Mieth (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (pp. 1-22) 
CUP 2014. 
   
14 
II. Human dignity as a regulatory tool in the bioethics of 
genome editing practices 
What are the ethical issues raised by research, technology and actual germline editing? How does human 
dignity intervene at each of these steps as a tool for regulation and how is this influenced by its different 
interpretations?  
 
a. Acceptability to society: understandings of dignity 
 
i. Ethical issues and the law: the importance of regulating human genome editing 
 
Towards the end of 2018, the birth of two non-identical twins was announced as the result of a 
scientific experiment. Nana and Lulu, as they are referred to, are the first known genetically-engineered 
human babies. They are the product of new gene-editing technology and unsanctioned experimentation 
on human beings, in what has been termed a "monstrous", "irresponsible" and "deeply ethically 
problematic" undertaking.68 In 2017, Chinese scientist He Jiankui set out to experiment on the genes of 
otherwise healthy embryos from infertile couples with one HIV-positive parent, using the technology of 
CRISPR-cas 9. His aim was to produce individuals that would be HIV-resistant at birth through germline 
editing. This aim, from what information is available, does not seem to have been met with success. 
However, the multiple points of failures surrounding this controversial experiment make it uniquely suited 
for an analysis of the issues raised in consideration of research on gene editing, during the course of its 
experimentation, and on its consequences. It is our particular interest to underline not only the need for 
regulation, but the role played by existing regulations and ethical guidelines at each step of this process. 
In the search for the role played by human dignity in the bioethics of gene editing, we aim to show 
precisely how it is used in its instrumental capacity in regulation. We will first focus on human dignity as 
the core underlying notion behind current guiding principles in medical and scientific research pertaining to 
the human body and its genetic identity. While human dignity is but one principle of biomedical ethics, it 
serves as a basis for human rights principles, bringing it within the arsenal of legal tools employed in 
agreements over the regulation of gene editing technologies. In addition, it is widely employed in the 
discourse of bioethics for reasons which we will also explore. 
 
 In 2002, the American President’s Council on Bioethics published a report on Human 
Cloning and Human Dignity.69 Within this report was an analysis of the ethical, moral and social stakes 
behind human experimentation, including the use of embryos in scientific research. The Council argued 
                                                     
68 Julian Savulescu (26 November 2018) http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2018/11/press-statement-
monstrous-gene-editing-experiment/ accessed 13 October 2019; Sarah Chang, ‘Claims over human 
genome editing: scientific irresponsibility at its worst’ (28 November 2018) 
https://blogs.bmj.com/medical-ethics/2018/11/28/claims-over-human-genome-editing-scientific-
irresponsibility-at-its-worst/ accessed 13 October 2019. 
69 The President's Council on Bioethics, ‘Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry’ (2002). 
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that the foreseeable consequences of allowing such research – after underlining safety risks, issues of 
consent, patient exploitation, risk distribution, for instance—would result in the objectification and 
dehumanisation of human worth. Boundaries, stated the report, should be drawn to protect the inviolable 
nature of human persons, or what has been termed their human dignity. The report emphasised that the 
necessity to protect against human rights violation as well as the risk of encroachment upon the moral 
value of human life, essential to the fabric of society, outweighed the potential benefits brought about by 
medical progress. The Council concluded on a complete ban on the birth of children produced by 
experimentation and a majority was in favour of a ban on using embryos for research.70 In 2016, the 
Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the leading UK advisory body on bioethics, produced a report establishing 
that heritable genome editing, another name for germline editing, which translates to making changes to 
the human genome that would pass down to future generations, could be considered ethically acceptable 
under specific circumstances.71 In 2018, the first two genetically engineered babies were born from He 
Jiankui’s experiment. A third baby may be expected for 2019,72 while Japan has only just legalised 
experimentations on chimeras, modifying human embryos with animal genes.73 On the other hand, 
condemnations ran high when He Jiankui’s operation was publicised, both nationally and internationally,74 
and numerous calls towards international consensus on tighter regulations as well as a rise in the 
examination of ethical positions regarding gene editing on humans are being witnessed. 
 
 It is perhaps again not surprising that human dignity is so widely invoked in this context, 
as it is in line with the aim to ensure that scientific development, from research to application, proceeds 
not only in respect with human rights but also in consideration with ethical principles.75 Ethics is the 
process by which choices and their consequences are examined in terms of rights or wrongs, and their 
acceptability judged consistent with recognised moral values. It serves as a necessary referee in the world 
of scientific research and experimentation, and is even more crucial when the technologies called upon 
are closely enmeshed with the essential characteristics that make up a human being. Put succinctly: 
"Ethics is the study of what we ought to do; science is the study of how the world works. Ethics is 
essential to scientific research in defining the concepts we use (such as the concept of ‘medical need’), 
deciding which questions are worth addressing, and what we may do to sentient beings in research."76  
The sphere of bioethics, which applies to scientific research concerned with the relationships 
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between living organisms and their environments — essentially fields that are related to and derived from 
biology — deals "more specifically with the philosophical, social and legal issues arising in medicine and 
the life sciences."77 Although the term can be interpreted narrowly to only refer to ethical issues within the 
life sciences, it has been used here with the broader interpretation that "bioethics may also be understood 
as including the legal aspects of biomedical issues," as defended by academic Roberto Andorno.78 
Bioethics is both a study of the standards around biotechnologies and of the legal regulations in place to 
enforce them, and as such it includes both legal and ethical standards and norms. It is within this sphere 
that human dignity has seen a surge in popularity as a human standard to gauge practices.79  
 
 
b.  Human dignity in the law of bioethics: human right principle or 
ethical principle? (I?) 
 
i. Understandings of dignity: the stakes of a clear consensus 
 
"Today, the widespread contemporary use of human dignity both in law and in ethics is under the 
spotlight, particularly in the areas of law and medical ethics. The underlying consensus about what human 
dignity means or requires is increasingly in question. […] The way in which in our pluralist society we 
develop and hold on to a shared understanding of such a key concept can have an immense influence on 
the quality of moral and social developments of people, and in particular on the practical development of 
law."80 The higher level the concept, and the more it is used not only in itself but to delineate other 
boundaries, the more crucial it becomes to define it clearly in order to ascertain a common, workable 
understanding. Unfortunately, it is equally true that "the more important the concept, the less likely it is that 
we can expect to be able to define it in a clear and unambiguous fashion."81 Human dignity is a prime 
example in the domain of biotechnologies, and especially the controversial corner of human genetics 
where morally and socially complex issues are raised. Ultimately, the usefulness of the notion as a 
regulatory tool is an ongoing inquiry and one that should be kept so to gauge its adaptation to current 
issues. However, regardless of the difficulties brought by the ubiquitous use of the concept with its 
multiplicity of definitions, we hope to demonstrate that there is a need for an international consensus 
around what constitutes the essential characteristics of a human being in such a way that enabling its 
flourishing presents inherent worth while curtailing it is of negative value.  
 
An ethical approach to human dignity differs from a legal one as it looks at the linguistic and 
philosophical roots of the concept rather than its interpretation through legal texts and jurisprudence. From 
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Jack Donnelly’s linguistic analysis of the word and its origin, dignity can be considered a “worth that 
demands respect”, while the “claim of human dignity is that simply being human makes one worthy or 
deserving of respect”. In relationship to human rights, the concept of dignity is used to describe the duties 
and rights afforded by this respect to the individual, and thus they become “one particular mechanism—a 
particular set of practices—for realising a certain class of conceptions of human dignity.”82 Dignity has 
undergone a process of evolution from its origin as a philosophical notion to its current form as a 
prominent ethical and legal principle.  Indeed, there are "major paradigms of dignity that have contributed 
over the centuries to shape the modern idea that every individual has inherent worth"83 and become the 
source of rights derived from this established worth, with the ambition of serving as a universal moral 
standard.  
 
The main issue being that such universal appeal has reduced the clarity of how human dignity is 
defined to the risk of becoming a meaningless and amorphous concept, and as such reducing its impact 
and utility. There are a great many interpretations of what its stands for, what its purpose is and how it 
achieves it, although there is some overlap. This is further complicated by the fact that scientific 
development aims to progress in line with a joint respect for ethical principles and for human rights, both of 
which may call upon the notion of dignity in different ways, from a broader perspective of values to a 
rights-based approach.The nuances of this notion through its historical developments and applications 
and its use in the discourse of bioethics nevertheless show that, while philosophically diverse, its roots 
have converged towards a unified construct that can stand as a cornerstone of ethical and legal theory.84 
 
The philosophical conception of an essence that captures the status and value of the 
quintessential experience of existence as a human being, human dignity has existed since the Ancient 
Greeks and perhaps beyond, as a social and civic value throughout Christian interpretations in the Middle 
relying on religion and leading to the establishment of natural law.85 It is seen as the defining characteristic 
of human beings. When described in this manner, its relationship with the human genome, the scientific 
expression of the essence that characterises a being as belonging to the human species, becomes 
evident. Human dignity is the moral corollary to the scientific expression present through the human 
genome and above that a principle that has been imbued with legal weight. It is then a fitting tool to serve 
as an ethical standard to manipulations of the genome, which become manipulations of the physical 
vessel of one’s dignity.  
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ii. The maximisation of human dignity: a theory of bioethics in the context of 
genome editing 
 
Throughout his book on Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law, Charles Foster defends the thesis 
that dignity is the “bioethical Theory of Everything.”86 While bioethics are guided, in addition to the role 
played by human rights, by a set of diverse principles collated to cover a variety of scenarios, Foster 
contends that there are inadmissible gaps between these principles, which cannot function in a unified 
theory of bioethics. He postulates that existing ethical principles discussed earlier, and especially 
autonomy as the central one in terms of ethical standard in the care of individuals, fail to provide adequate 
responses in edge cases. They presuppose the agency of the individual, a problematic premise when it 
comes to regulating the ethical status of unattached bodily components, such as genetic material, or 
individuals who may not legally and practically be capable of this agency, or individuals who are only 
considered individuals-in-waiting in the case of embryo cells for example, notwithstanding the continuing 
debate around personhood and its defining characteristics. The question is, then, how human dignity 
performs in those edge cases and whether it effectively outperforms other ethical principles to the point of 
surpassing them as the normative standard for bioethics. Charles Foster proposes a model that is 
surprising close to the moral framework deployed in utilitarianism, a consequentialist approach to 
normative ethics that seeks to maximise the overall good produced as the result of an action, where this 
good is ‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest number’.87 In Foster’s proposal, one would consider 
instead whether a specific solution would maximise the amount of dignity in the world and evaluate as 
such between competing interests, while approaching human dignity as “objective human flourishing”.88 
When enhancing the amount of dignity in the world, he declares, one enhances the very characteristics of 
humanity. Human dignity is therefore not the defining characteristic of humanity in the sense that it is the 
distinctive element that distinguishes it, but in the sense that it is the element that measures its presence 
and existence, the marker of humanity understood as a self-realised state of being. Autonomy is then 
seen as a function or manifestation of human dignity. Some caveats must nevertheless be raised to this 
theory. If it is to be workable, dignity cannot be an amorphous, over-stretched notion spread between 
overlapping yet competing understandings that seek to make use of its symbolic importance to fill a legal 
or ethical gap. In addition, while human dignity would become a parent principle and possess primacy 
over other ethical principles, Foster concedes that “it is not very obviously superior to other principles in 
the realm of resource allocation and distributive justice generally.” Instead, “its superiority is most 
dramatically on display when the focus of the ethical inquiry is on the status of an individual human.”89 Our 
exploration of this application of dignity as a regulatory tool will thus be conducted over the facts and 
consequences of such a case, the experiment led by He Jiankui. 
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c.  Ethical issues in biotechnology research & dignity 
 
"[Human] genetics ... is beginning to create a new generation of acute and subtle dilemmas that 
will in the new millennium transform the ways in which we think of ourselves and of society. It is genetics, 
bringing both a new understanding of what we are and almost daily developing new ways of enabling us 
to influence what we are, that is creating a revolution in thought, and not least in ethics."90 We will 
consider the ethical issues raised by research, technology, and specifically germline editing, as well as 
how human dignity relates to and can be effective at each step as a tool for regulation. In order to delve 
into the workability of human dignity as a regulatory tool, this analysis of these issues will be undertaken 
first through the   
 
 
It is clear from an ethical perspective that scientific research proceeds from the position that 
human life is valuable and should be preserved. Biomedical ethics promote a series of principal to ensure 
that procedures, both in research and applied medicine, respect core principles to ensure the minimisation 
of harm to patients and society, and a form of ‘due process’ standard. The first of these is justice, seeking 
to establish fairness and equality in the distribution of risks and benefits in the provision not only of 
medical practices but also resources, for patients and also for researchers, doctors and throughout 
territories. Indeed, the idea of justice covers a large scope, from procedural and substantive fairness to 
equality of access, non-discrimination, and distributive allocation of resources according to the needs of 
society.91 The two next principles, benevolence and non-maleficence, should be considered together to 
"aim at producing net benefit over harm."92 They emerge from the Hippocratic oath to "do no harm", 
interpreted through benevolence as ensuring a net benefit while reducing harmful effects as much as 
possible. Medical procedures as well as the development of human altering technologies, from research to 
application, should proceed in such a way that they are not be harmful, not only to the patient but also to 
society, or at least must minimise the risk of harm. The last principle is that of autonomy, and the one most 
collated with human dignity insofar as one approach of dignity is through human agency, and the Kantian 
view that humans must be treated as autonomous agents that are an end in themselves and not merely 
means to something.93 The most widespread manifestation of autonomy is consent or the necessity for 
participants to make fully-informed decisions free of coercion or coaxing. Human dignity would then be 
given the same substantive value as these principles and used to preserve the physical and spiritual (in 
terms of faith or belief) integrity of patients as well as  
 
 
                                                     
90 John Harris, ‘Introduction: The Scope and Importance of Bioethics’ in John Harris (ed.), Bioethics, OUP 
2001. 
91 David Miller, ‘Justice’ (2017) https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justice/ (accessed 2 December 2019). 
92 Raanan Gillon, ‘Medical ethics: four principles plus attention to scope’ (1994) BMJ Clinical Research; 
‘What are the Basic Principles of Medical Ethics’. 
93 Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, (no 65). 
   
20 
i. Interests of research participants (privacy, informed consent) 
 
The interests of research participants are closely guarded through two mechanisms: their informed 
consent to safeguard their autonomy and the privacy of their data and information. In the latter, He Jiankui 
can be said to have taken measures to preserve the families’ informations, going so far as to hide the 
names of the nurses and doctors having practiced the procedures on them. However, in terms of informed 
consent there is clearly an issue in his experiment. He Jiankui attempted to publish his experiment for 
accreditation, a publication that was refused ostensibly due to a faulty processing of consent forms. In 
addition, it appears that the parents may have been pressured due to two factors, invalidating their 
consent. He Jiankui recruited couples that were infertile and with one parent HIV positive. In China, HIV 
positivity imposes a social stigma and fertility procedures are often refused on those grounds. However, 
He Jiankui targeted a vulnerable patient group and additionally pressured them by promising access to 
fertility treatment. It is also unclear whether the parents clearly understood the nature of the experiment, 
as it was presented on the form under the terms  "HIV vaccination." It is somewhat ludicrous to realise the 
amount of misuse present in the one case, a case with very real consequences for the families and 
especially children impacted.94 
 
Some of the issues in He Jiankui’s experimental procedure and its consequences include a lack of ethical 
review and accountability, as there is absolutely no transparence on funding and the university denies 
having approved his research.95 In addition, he has been accused of misrepresenting data as his team did 
not actually reproduce the mutation it sought to but created new ones.96 The medical benefits of the 
experiment are dubious at best, as HIV is controlled through existing medication, meaning that there is no 
need to engage in experimental procedures on live babies. Sperm-washing, an already established 
method was used to prevent parental transmission of HIV, further ensuring that the immediate benefit 
seem remote.9798 
 
 
d.  Ethical issues in biotechnology application & dignity 
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i. Social concerns (rights & legal protections of creatures, resource allocation) 
 
The Oviedo convention particularly states under article 13 regarding interventions on the human 
genome that they "may only be undertaken for preventive, diagnostic or therapeutic purposes and only if 
its aim is not to introduce any modification in the genome of any descendants."99 It appears obvious that 
concerns having a potential impact on social order, the environment or presentic health risks must be 
properly assessed before being given the go ahead. In addition, germline editing poses issues of moral 
permissibility and social acceptability, two serious concerns that have a far-reaching impact at a global 
level in addition to a personal one on the lives of the affected individuals. It is clear that He Jiankui’s 
malpractice has had an effect on the perceptions relating to the bioethics of gene editing, however there is 
some fear that it may be too late. It is certainly too late for the individuals who suffer the consequences of 
the experiment, as to whether it is too late to stop and regulate further experimentation on the subject, this 
remains to be seen. 
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III. The future of human dignity in the changing landscape of 
gene editing practices and its impact on bioethics 
Does human genome editing reinforce or violate human dignity? What are the 
immediate effects of the availability of gene editing technologies on human life and how 
are they compatible with a future that promotes the place of the individual in global 
networks? 
  
 
 
a.  The revolution of human genetics in the law  
 
"Scientific and technological progress [permits] increasing control of our 
environment and ... our living conditions. In the fields of biology and genetics especially, 
progress is all the more staggering since man, for the first time, has the power to 
transform living matter in a programmed and selective manner. ... It is above all in the 
biomedical field that progress has been the most spectacular and provokes the most 
questions, especially since it involves living human beings."100 The social and cultural 
change brought by the advent of the age of media and communication has been 
compounded with the rapid pace of evolution in sciences and technologies, and the 
effects of these, now in conjunction with the revolution brought about by gene editing, 
has necessitated a redefinition of our perception of the place of human beings in the 
world. As technologies progress, their perception and assimilation into common 
knowledge lead to social and cultural acceptance. It becomes necessary to take a look 
at the applicable laws and reflect such changes on the legal system, not only to keep the 
legislation relevant but also to protect against new abuses and address emerging issues 
or areas of uncertainty.101 In other words, "we are faced once again with the need to 
assess the socio-ethical and legal implications of intentional modification of the human 
germline, as the nearly unanimous condemnation of germ-line modification in the 1990s 
pre-empted the very debate that should have been taking place over the past 25 
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years."102 Clear policies are necessary to draw an effective jurisdictional framework able 
to enforce current and future international, agreed-upon norms, something which is 
currently lacking. The examination of edge cases where it is more difficult to keep to a 
dogmatic prohibition of medical research due to pressing needs, such as disability or 
gene therapy applications to illnesses, may shed some light on the boundaries of such 
policies. As such, we will look at some of the emerging points of contention in the 
specific domain of human gene editing, which is only a subset of the more pressing 
concerns raised by new technologies but also the one with the potential to most directly 
impact human life from within. Using human dignity as a measuring rod for the ethical 
acceptability and usability of human gene editing practices, this section of the 
dissertation explores under which circumstances and in what context medical research 
and application become a necessity, as well as how to ensure the definition of a 
common framework for this context to be achieved. 
 
 
b.  Germline Editing: human dignity and medical research 
 
The practice of heritable genome editing or germline editing is the one use of 
gene editing biotechnologies where prohibition raises the most "widespread global 
agreement that [it] should remain off-limits".103 Some have nevertheless asserted that 
germline editing is the way forward,104 despite concerns over the spectre of eugenics 
and the accompanying atrocities committed during the Second World War. Indeed, while 
this control afforded over the minutiae of human biological systems "has the potential to 
increase healthcare options," it also "prompts fears that attempts to control present 
health could injure future health" and "the capability to “design” the humans of the future, 
[also excites] anxiety over sex and genetic discrimination and the development of 
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heretofore unheard of liability claims."105 An exploration of this boundary line drawn 
around gene editing is precisely the opportunity to understand what is at stake in terms 
of the fears and possibilities that arise from its potential applications. Human dignity has 
been proposed as the normative standard of human genome editing in bioethics. We 
ask two questions: is heritable gene editing, a practice that may touch on the very nature 
what it means to be human, the essential identity of not only an individual but the 
species as a whole, compatible with human dignity in the first place? Secondly, is there 
the possibility of an international consensus around this issue in terms of ethical 
principles that would be used to describe its regulation, in other words, is it possible to 
reach a consensus as to the basis of the ethical principles, for example, human dignity, 
that would be employed to regulate germline editing? This is no longer purely theoretical 
given the human consequences of He Jiankui’s experiment. 106 107108 
 
ii. Human dignity and the international consensus on its regulation  
 
Xu Nianping, the Chinese vice-minister for science and technology, had 
announced following the backlash that He Jiankui’s experiment was in violation of 
“China’s relevant laws and regulations" and of "the ethical bottom line that the academic 
community adheres to", declaring it "shocking and unacceptable.”109 China is now 
poised to introduce new gene-editing regulations in reaction to the scandal around the 
experiment.110 "The draft regulations, issued by the National Health Commission on 26 
February, state that gene editing in any type of cell that will end up in humans, including 
embryos, will need the commission’s approval, as will other high-risk biomedical 
procedures." These new regulations notably introduce penalties, which were previously 
lacking, for their infringement. These penalties range from fines to grant blacklisting.111 
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Several Chinese scientists have reacted, often advocating for stricter and clearer 
regulations and hailing the incident as a wake-up call to the dangers of a lack of 
consequences and transparency in the context of the potential issues and uncertainty 
surrounding new biotechnologies. Such an article states that: "These characteristics of 
emerging biotechnologies [such as bias in data, uncertain outcomes due to complex and 
interdependent factors and potential risk to future generations] illustrate why a 
proactionary approach is inappropriate. Instead, we have to take an approach called lun 
li xian xing (ethically thinking ahead of action). Before we launch any project that uses 
these emerging biotechnologies, we have to develop tentative regulations based on 
comprehensive inquiry and rigorous ethical discussion." In addition, the authors add that 
"cultural differences are not a justifiable reason to reject international guidelines and 
refuse to participate in international efforts to develop shared regulations on the 
innovations, R&D, and applications of biotechnologies."112 Indeed, one of the most 
commonly raised arguments regarding human rights, and the universality of human 
dignity is that of cultural relativism. This is the notion that social or moral values are 
culturally determined, and that cultural diversity presupposes the impossibility of the 
universality of one such value. In addition, attempts to press this universality are seen as 
supporting "the hegemony of the dominant global powers."113 The same arguments have 
been used against the workability of international bioethics regulations, especially given 
assumptions of "a scientific ethical divide between China and [the] West".114 In 2015, 
Members of the Chinese National Medical Ethical Committee had declared in the press 
that "ethics are a question of culture, and that is about tradition, especially where it 
touches on human life,” adding that “inside China, there are people who are opposed to 
international standards, citing cultural differences.”115  
 
 
c. Gene Therapy: human dignity and medical application 
 
The Human Genome Project has made predictions on the integration of gene 
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therapy into ordinary life and its legal impact on courts.116 The issues projected, new 
categories of medical litigation, new social differentiation and areas of discrimination 
also present unforeseen control over one’s life and health. The report paints a very 
different world in an attempt to face necessary debates and awareness around ethical, 
moral and social quandaries that may seem distant but are growing increasingly closer 
as biotechnological progress continues. There are, as we have discussed, compelling 
arguments in favour of integrating gene editing into the medical tool set available to deal 
with disability, illness and genetic diseases. Gene therapy is considered particularly 
promising in the field of research against cancer, able to provide the ability to experiment 
around the genetic characteristics of cancer cells and deeper insights into their 
manipulation.117 Existing human rights, such as the right to health, may compel the 
continuation of such research. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognises the right to the highest standard of physical and 
mental health It asserts that its parties have an obligation to take steps to improve 
hygiene, prevent diseases, assure medical service and reduce infant mortality in order to 
achieve the full realisation of this right.118 It is inevitable that a discussion on the 
integration of gene editing in medical practices requires the need for a re-examination of 
human enhancement, which touches on the controversial subject of eugenics, in light of 
now decades of setting up an elaborate system built around a value of human dignity 
that stands against the commodification of human individuals and their characteristics. 
 
Existing bioethics principles seek to minimise risks of harm by regulating 
experimental research in terms of net benefit. "In deciding whether a risk is reasonable, 
it is important to evaluate not only the probability of achieving a benefit, but also the 
extent of the benefit in question. A greater expected benefit is worth greater risk than a 
smaller expected benefit."119 The prohibition of eugenics set out in the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court declares this practice part of the crimes against 
                                                     
116 Maxwell J. Mehlman, 'The Human Genome Project and the Courts: Gene Therapy and Beyond' (1997) 
268 Faculty Publications  
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1267&context=faculty_publica
tions 
117 Tianzuo Zhan and others, 'CRISPR/Cas9 for cancer research and therapy' (2019) 55 Seminars in 
Cancer Biology; ’Gene Editing Tool Fights Cancer in Early Study’ (2019) 
https://www.webmd.com/cancer/news/20191107/gene-editing-tool-fights-cancer-in-early-study 
118 ICESCR, article 12 
119 Julian Savulescu and Peter Singer, 'An ethical pathway for gene editing' (2019) 33  Bioethics 221–222 
   
27 
humanity.120 The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also reinforces this prohibition in its 
article on the right of a person to integrity.121 This is clarified in the commentary on the 
Charter as pertaining specifically to the selection of persons in a widespread, deliberate 
operation such as situations of "campaigns for sterilisation, forced pregnancy, 
compulsory ethnic marriage" for ethnic cleansing purposes, such as what was 
performed during the Second World War.122 
 
 
Erik Parens, when attempting to elucidate a structure for the debate on human 
enhancement, argues that its current uncertain state relies on several ethical 
frameworks of authenticity born from different understandings of authenticity’s 
meaning.123 He describes authenticity as being true to oneself, or the self-fulfilment of 
one’s own flourishing. It is my opinion instead that the notion of authenticity is not the 
one in question, but a particular conception of agency that calls upon a moral claim to 
freedom of self-determination. This need to respect both individual and collective agency 
harkens back to the Kantian approach of dignity. It brings up a tension between 
questions of desirability and worth, a theme that is pregnant in the debate around the 
(pre)selection of desirable genetic characteristics. Erik Parens also notes, "Jonathan 
Glover observed that enhancement technologies force us to think anew about the oldest, 
most pressing, and most infuriatingly difficult of questions: What does human flourishing 
consist in?"124 Indeed, this is an essential premise to enable us to assess whether these 
technologies, gene editing in our case, will promote or harm human flourishing. It is also 
the reason why I believe that the principle in play relates to the conception of human 
dignity as explored in this dissertation. Charles Foster, when describing dignity as the 
bioethical golden standard, contends that “human thriving is connected to human 
dignity”.125 Foster argues that flourishing is about being, and human dignity is about 
being human. As such, enhancement Michael Sandel criticises the dangers of new 
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biotechnologies that give unforeseen control over the human biomechanics when 
applied to human enhancement, arguing that “they represent a kind of hyperagency.”126 
They promote “a drive to mastery” that is at risk of destroying “an appreciation of the 
gifted character of human powers and achievement.”127 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The premise of a discussion on human genome and bioethics is that of complex 
issues being raised, touching on the social and biological evolution of our species in a 
current situation where the effective application of regulatory measure is being outpaced 
by advances in biotechnologies. Ideas of genetic selection and discrimination, 
reproductive and human enhancement biotechnologies that facilitate eugenics, identity 
and the tension between individual value and socially assigned worth, arising from an 
environment where human gene-editing is a reality and its use readily available are no 
longer the purview of exploratory science fiction movies like Gattaca.128 It is a premise 
where the international community aims to ensure that the sentence "your scientists 
were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, they didn’t stop to think if they 
should"129 is never uttered—with, as we have seen, varying degrees of success 
considering the fact that He Jiankui’s unsanctioned experiment led to the birth of 
genetically engineered human babies, individuals who will be directly confronted to 
issues of genetic alteration in their personal lives. Amidst the attempts made to regulate 
these biotechnologies, their research, their experimentation and application, two issues 
have surfaced in particular. The need for a collective consensus on the values and 
standards used to evaluate and form the basis for a system of governance. The certainty 
that unless a consensus is reached, national control of biotechnologies that may affect 
the entire human species risks being insufficient. 
 
Today’s world has been revolutionised by the technologies we use, technologies 
which have led to a thinning of the shell provided by the State and the institution of Law 
between an individual’s private sphere and the public, collective sphere. Legal questions 
of privacy, property and identity are being raised in a globalised data-driven world, and 
are now further blurring these boundaries. Human gene editing poses the same threat to 
our self-actualisation but at a biological level, one that may far outreach the impact of 
                                                     
128 Gattaca (1997) https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0119177/  accessed 8 December 2019 
129 Jurassic Park (1993) https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107290/ accessed 8 December 2019 
   
30 
social or economic concerns on the future of human beings given its potential for altering 
the very essence of our nature. In the end, this dissertation seeks to explore multiple 
questions raised by vast legal concepts in a changing world, concepts of identity, 
respect, and human worth embodied through one notion—human dignity. Concepts 
dwell in the world of ideas. They necessarily fail when applied to an imperfect external 
world. However, this failure is not necessarily a definitive failure if they still serve a 
purpose. The first question that emerges, then, is what purpose? In order to evaluate the 
concept itself, whether it fulfils its role, how it goes about it, if it is more efficient than 
another in reaching its end, one must know the goal that is sought. That is the first 
thorny question because as we have seen, there is no consensus on the precise role 
played by human dignity in the law. Instead, there is a consensus on its importance. 
Perhaps that is enough, and what is needed is this consensus that there is an significant 
value to be protected in humanity, one from which we can derive substantive rights. 
What remains and needs to be defined is then the actual content of these rights. The 
international community has rallied around guidelines and conventions, however these 
must be enforceable in order to serve as regulations. 
 
The recourse to a human rights framework in bioethics has been explained by 
some out of a necessity to apply the language of rights to the normative standard that is 
dignity in order to functionally enforce claims of competing interests.130 Nevertheless, 
several aspects of this implementation are troubling. The lack of a hierarchisation of 
rights does not provide a blueprint to assess conflicts of interests unfortunately frequent 
in biotechnologies, such as the right to health of an individual weighed against the 
human dignity of the species. Other ethical principles fail as well. For example, the 
problem of personhood raised by employing personal autonomy, that is, consent, to 
determine whether speculative practices should be applied when considering embryo 
cells that are not recognised as individuals. This is solved in part by using dignity, 
through the prism of a notion applicable not only to the individual but to the collective 
definition of humanity and also an idea of residual dignity available not only to the whole 
being in life but to body parts or corpses. Paradoxically, human dignity is also used to 
defend against the enhancement or treatment of the individual in the name of the 
collective good. Perhaps more interestingly than a mere extension of human rights into 
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bioethics, a more effective pathway would adopt an independant bioethical framework 
relying on an overarching conception of dignity as the measuring standard of 
achievement, factoring the incorporation of human-rights based approaches as applied 
in development. Through the integration of a process that promotes and protects human 
right principles of universality and inalienability, indivisibility, interdependence and 
interrelatedness, accountability and the rule of law, participation and inclusion and finally 
equality and non-discrimination,131 the benefits of a human rights could be applied to 
bioethics without some of its drawbacks in a more flexible manner.   
 
As we have seen in the present work, the ongoing debate over gene editing has 
not yet given us a comprehensive tool set for the arising issues, including a clear and 
unambiguous definition on the principle of human dignity applied to bioethics. However, 
as stated by Conti, "as increasingly accurate genome editing technology proliferates 
across national borders, a coherent and cohesive international stance on the issue is 
more urgently needed than ever. Time waits for no human right.".132 Proof of this 
urgency has been amply demonstrated by the experience of He Jiankui’s experiment. 
Thus despite a generally positive attitude towards science, humanity is gaining access to 
incredibly approachable133 technologies that promote eugenism, originally articulated by 
Francis Galton as: “the science of improving stock, which is by no means confined to 
questions of judicious mating, but [includes] all influences that tend in however remote a 
degree to give to the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing 
speedily over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had).”134 A desire to 
perfect our lives has led to technological improvements that may ultimately, as a 
collective aggregate, propel our momentum on the path of hyper control to 
instrumentalising ourselves. That is precisely why a continued ethical questioning and 
awareness of our value as human beings is necessary, and why the notion of human 
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dignity as the flourishing of humanity—both the species and the quality—is so crucial. 
 
